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ABSTRACT:  U.S. exports of poultry to Mexico have increased steadily since NAFTA came into force
in January 1994. The Mexican poultry industry has become increasingly concerned about these exports,
arguing that it cannot compete with U.S. products. The Mexicans argue that U.S. poultry exports to
Mexico are duty free under NAFTA (as of January 1, 2003). The Mexican industry also argues that U.S.
poultry benefits from low-priced feed resulting from U.S. Government farm programs. We analyzed the
impact of tariffs and U.S. feed grain programs on U.S. exports of poultry, and find that other factors
appear to be more important in explaining trade. Specifically, Mexican preferences for dark meat provide
large price incentives for U.S. exporters, while Mexican Government policies in support of its grain
sector penalize poultry producers in Mexico.     
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Since NAFTA came into force in January 1994, Mexican agricultural exports to the United States
(accounting for 80 percent of all Mexican agricultural exports) have more than doubled, reaching in
excess of $7 billion last year.
2 U.S. foreign investment in Mexico has also grown to record levels in recent
years under NAFTA. Mexican agricultural production of all major crops and livestock has expanded over
the past 10 years in spite of increased competition from U.S. imports.
3 Although overall Mexican
production and exports have expanded, there is concern that gains of increased trade and investment have
not been shared equally within Mexico’s agricultural sector, and the vast majority of Mexico’s small
farmers, or “campesinos,” remains poor.
4
Faced with declining rural incomes and increasing poverty, farm worker groups, such as “The
Farmland Can’t Stand Anymore,” El Barzon, and the National Farm Workers’ Confederation (CNC),
claim increased agricultural imports under NAFTA are to blame for declining incomes.
5 In January, 2003
the PRD party joined these groups in submitting a position paper before the Mexican Congress calling for
the renegotiation of NAFTA’s chapter on agriculture. So far the call to reopen NAFTA has been resisted
by President Fox, despite considerable political pressure on him to do so and mid-term elections in early
July 2003.
6 The United States has expressed no interest in NAFTA renegotiation.
Under NAFTA, Mexican tariffs on all but a few imported agricultural products from the United
States were eliminated as of January 1, 2003, with the exception of corn, beans, milk powder, and sugar.
According to the opponents of NAFTA, Mexico’s small- and medium-sized farmers cannot survive the
competition from U.S. exports, given the efficiency and low-cost structure of U.S. agriculture.
7 In
addition to objecting to tariffs, Mexicans on all sides of the NAFTA debate complain bitterly that U.S.
farm programs have tilted the playing field sharply in favor of the United States.
8 In particular, the 2002
Farm Act
9 will provide farm payments of about $107 billion over the next 10 years to farmers (excluding
unanticipated emergency payments), which, in the view of many Mexicans, will encourage U.S.
production and depress prices to the detriment of Mexican farmers.
10 U.S. officials counter by claiming
that farm support remains within limits established under the WTO Agriculture Agreement and that
spending on farm programs under the new legislation is not significantly different from the previous
several years.
11 Such arguments have done little to change Mexican sentiment. Most Mexicans view U.S.
farm programs as an unfair trading practice, providing ample justification for NAFTA to be reopened.
The purpose of this paper is to identify and gauge the relative importance of the factors that
explain recent trends in Mexican imports of poultry from the United States. We explore several factors
including the effects of tariffs under NAFTA, U.S. Government programs, and feed costs in both the3
Figure 1: Mexican Imports of Chilled and Frozen Chicken from the














































United States and Mexico. We also evaluate other competitive factors influencing Mexican poultry
production, such as Mexican Government payments to grain farmers, the structure of Mexico’s poultry
sector, and structural challenges facing the entire agricultural sector in Mexico. We include a brief
discussion of the recent NAFTA safeguard imposed on U.S. exports of chicken leg quarters into Mexico.
Finally, we comment on the potential for Mexico to become an exporting country of poultry meat to the
United States.
Trends in Mexican Tariffs and Imports of U.S. Poultry
Nowhere is pressure greater to renegotiate NAFTA than from the Mexican poultry sector. As
shown in figure 1, Mexican tariffs dropped under NAFTA from 260 percent in 1994 to zero on January 1,
2003, with most of the reductions taking place since 1999 when poultry tariffs still remained at 200
percent. Meanwhile, Mexican imports of U.S. chicken increased from about 70,000 metric tons in 1995 to
close to 170,000 metric tons in 2002, an annual increase of about 14 percent. Simply on the basis of these
trends, it would appear that tariff reductions under NAFTA are part of the story in explaining growth in
poultry imports.
Impact of U.S. Farm Program
Mexican poultry officials have argued that as a result of the U.S. Government’s price and income
support of grain producers, U.S. poultry producers gain access to low-cost feed inputs that allow them to
export to Mexico with an unfair advantage. Table 1 provides information on U.S. support for corn. In
2000 payments exceeded $10 billion and in 2003 payments are expected to be almost $5 billion. On
average during 1998-2002, government payments represented about one-third of the farmgate price,
reaching almost 60 percent of the price in 2000.     
12 Westcott, P.C., and J.M. Price, “Analysis of the U.S. Commodity Loan Program with Marketing Loan
Provisions,” USDA, ERS, Report No. 801, Apr. 2001.
     
13 Westcott, P.C., C. E. Young, and J.M. Price, “The 2002 Farm Act: Provisions and Implications for Commodity
Markets,” USDA, ERS, Agricultural Information Bulletin Number 778, Nov. 2002.
     




U.S. Government support for corn, 1998-2003
Item 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003(
1)
Total government expenditure ($ million) ............ 2 , 8 7 7 5 , 4 0 3 1 0 , 1 3 6 6 , 2 9 7 3 , 2 3 7 4 , 8 0 7
Production (million metric tons) .................... 2 3 4 2 4 8 2 4 0 2 5 2 2 4 1 2 2 9
Government expenditure per ton ($/metric ton) ....... 1 2 2 2 4 2 2 5 1 3 2 1
F a r m g a t e  p r i c e  ( U S $ / m e t r i c  t o n )................... 9 6 7 6 7 2 7 3 7 8 9 4
Expenditure / farmgate price (percent) .............. 1 3 2 8 5 9 3 4 1 7 2 2
1 Estimate.
Source:  USDA, Farm Services Agency.
Do these payments explain the trends in Mexican poultry imports? More precisely, how much
would Mexican imports of poultry drop in the absence of the U.S. corn program? This question can be
broken down into three component questions. (1) How much would corn prices rise in the absence of the
U.S. corn program? (2) How much would U.S. poultry costs of production rise with increases in corn
prices? (3) How much would Mexican imports of poultry decline with increases in U.S. poultry cost of
production?
Estimating what corn prices in the United States would be if there were no farm programs is
problematic. Nonetheless, a recent study by the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture estimated the impact of eliminating a program that provides payments to farmers when
market prices fall below pre-determined, government-established prices.
12 This program, the “marketing
loan program,” is the program that creates the largest market distortions in terms of providing farmers’
incentives to over-produce because payments are directly linked to market prices. While it is true that
U.S. farmers receive payments through other government programs (for example, direct farm payments
under the 2002 Farm Bill), such payments are decoupled from market conditions and are not believed to
significantly alter farmers’ production and marketing decisions.
13 For example, there appears to have been
no production response to the massive emergency payments provided to corn growers during 1998-2000
(table 1). The USDA study indicated that without the marketing loan program, the price of corn would
rise, at most, by about 10 cents per bushel, while the price of soybeans would rise by about 50 cents per
bushel. In both cases, the price increase is about 5 percent. If other programs are assumed to result in
higher production and lower prices, prices of corn and soybeans might be expected to increase by at most
10 percent in the situation where no government support existed.
How would such corn and soybean price increases impact production costs in the U.S. poultry
sector? A cost breakdown is shown in table 2. Based on 2002 data, the wholesale cost of producing one
pound of chicken meat in the United States is about 48 cents, or $1.06 per kilo.
14 This includes the cost of
feeding the chicken to slaughter weight, as well as processing, marketing, transportation, and
administration expenses. Of this 48 cents per pound, the cost of feed is roughly 15 cents per pound, so
feed accounts for about one-third of the total cost of producing one pound of U.S. chicken meat. As stated
earlier, prices of corn and soybeans would be expected to increase by 10 percent if there were no
government payments. As shown in table 2, a 10 percent corn and soybean price rise means an increase in




U.S. poultry:  Cost of production components, 2002
Cost Unit 2002 2002 + 10%
1 2002 + 20%
2
C o r n  –  C h i c a g o............................ $ / b u s h e l 2 . 2 9 2 . 5 2 2 . 7 5
Location differential - Production area .......... $ / b u s h e l 0 . 4 5 0 . 4 5 0 . 4 5
Corn in production area ..................... $ / b u s h e l 2 . 7 4 2 . 9 7 3 . 2 0
Cost of corn 
3 ............................. $ / t o n  o f  r a t i o n 6 6 . 5 4 7 2 . 1 0 7 7 . 6 6
S o y m e a l  –  D e c a t u r ,  4 9 % .................... $ / t o n 168.81 185.69 202.57
Location differential - Production area .......... $ / t o n 1 9 . 3 0 1 9 . 3 0 1 9 . 3 0
Soymeal in production areas ................. $ / t o n 188.11 204.99 221.87
Cost of soymeal 
4 .......................... $ / t o n  o f  r a t i o n 4 8 . 9 1 5 3 . 3 0 5 7 . 6 9
Corn & soymeal - Production area ............  $ / t o n 115.45 125.40 135.35
A d j u s t m e n t  f o r  o t h e r  i n g r e d i e n t s............... $ / t o n 3 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 0
Milling & delivery cost ....................... $ / t o n 8 . 7 0 8 . 7 0 8 . 7 0
Total feed cost ............................ $ / t o n 154.15 164.10 174.05
Total feed cost ............................ ¢ /  l b . 7 . 7 1 8 . 2 0 8 . 7 0
Feed cost per lb. of live bird 
5 ................. ¢ /  l b . 1 5 . 4 1 1 6 . 4 1 1 7 . 4 0
Non Feed cost per lb. of live bird .............. ¢ /  l b . 1 0 . 3 5 1 0 . 3 5 1 0 . 3 5
T o t a l  c o s t  p e r  l b .  o f  l i v e  b i r d .................. ¢ /  l b . 2 5 . 7 6 2 6 . 7 6 2 7 . 7 5
Meat cost –  per lb. of ready to cook meat 
6 ...... ¢ /  l b . 3 3 . 9 0 3 5 . 2 1 3 6 . 5 2
Processing & marketing costs per lb. of ready to
cook meat
¢/ lb. 14.10 14.10 14.10
Total cost – per lb. of ready to cook meat ........ ¢ /  l b . 4 8 . 0 0 4 9 . 3 1 5 0 . 6 2
Feed cost / total cost ready to cook meat  ....... % 3 2 . 1 3 3 . 3 3 4 . 4
Increase in total feed cost .................... % 0 . 0 2 . 7 5 . 5
1 Cost of production assuming a 10 percent increase in corn and soybean meal prices.
2 Cost of production assuming a 20 percent increase in corn and soybean meal prices.
3 Assumes 35.7128 bushels per metric ton, and 68 percent corn in ration.
4 26 percent soybean meal in ration.
5 Assumes a conversion ratio of 2 pound of feed per pound of meat.
6 Assumes a dressing percentage of 76. That is, every pound of meat is equivalent to 1.76 pounds of live
bird.
Source:  Authors estimates, based on information from the Economic Research Services, U.S. Department
of Agriculture.
less than 3 percent. As an extreme case, we assumed corn and soybean price increase by 20 percent in the
absence of U.S. farm programs. In this case the overall cost of production for chicken meat increased by
less than 6 percent.
Finally, how much would Mexican poultry imports fall with the increase in cost of production?
The answer to this question requires an understanding of the characteristics of demand for poultry in the
United States and Mexico. There is well-documented evidence that U.S. consumers prefer breast (or
white) meat over drumsticks, thighs and wings (dark meat).
15 This has resulted in considerable price
differences between white meat and dark meat in the United States. These price differences are
demonstrated in table 3, which compares prices for white and dark meat in the United States and Mexico.     
16 Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Outlook, ERS, LDP-M-102, Dec. 2002.
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Table 3
Wholesale chicken prices in the United States and Mexico City
Location Breast meat Leg quarter
Leg quarter prices as percent of
breast meat prices
––––– Cents (per pound) ––––– –––––––––– Percent ––––––––––
United States:
M i d w e s t  U . S ..................             7 5               1 9   2 5
S o u t h e r n  U . S .   ...............             7 3               1 6   2 2
Northeast U.S.  ...............             7 5               1 9   2 5
Mexico City:
R a y o n ....................           113              75  66
S a n  J u a n ..................           117              75  64
N e w  S a n  J u a n ..............           117              80  68
B e c e r r a ...................           122              80  66
Source:  Agriculture Marketing Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Poultry Market News,” U.S. regional
prices for month of Jan. 2003 and Mexico City prices for week ending Jan. 24, 2003.
As shown, white meat sells for a considerable premium compared to dark meat in all parts of the
United States. Despite the significant price premium for white meat, U.S. consumers continue to prefer
white meat. To meet this demand U.S. producers produce 14 million metric tons of chicken per year.
16
However, white and dark meat is necessarily produced in a fixed proportion; there are no all-white meat
chickens. As a result, U.S. processors are left with a surplus of dark meat.
It is at this point that the differences in consumer demand between Mexico and the United States
become important. Mexican consumers have traditionally preferred dark meat to white meat. This has
resulted in a market that in some important ways is the mirror image of the U.S. market. As table 3 shows,
the preference for dark meat in Mexico has resulted in dark meat commanding prices that are much closer
to white meat. Further, table 3 highlights the significant price differences for dark meat in the United
States and Mexico. As a result of these differing consumer preferences and the resulting price differences,
Mexico offers a complementary market for U.S. poultry producers. U.S. processors, who hold an excess
supply of dark meat, therefore must choose between selling this product in the U.S. market at very low
prices or exporting to the Mexican market at considerably higher prices. These conditions create powerful
incentives for U.S. processors to export to Mexico.
Most importantly, the very large price differences between the U.S. and Mexican dark meat
markets would allow U.S. producers not only to overcome higher grain prices with no U.S. farm program,
but also to overlook very high tariffs. For example, assuming that in the absence of U.S. farm programs,
feed costs increase by 20 percent and total costs by 5 percent, the no program scenario might raise the
cost of U.S. chicken leg quarters from $0.20 cent pound to $0.21 cents per pound, while a Mexican tariff
of 100 percent would raise this price from $0.21 to $0.42 per pound. This price is still considerably below
the average Mexican price of $0.75-$0.80 per pound. Therefore, even in the face of higher production
costs and significant tariffs, U.S. producers would find it highly profitable to export to Mexico.
Analysis of Feed Costs in Mexico
Our analysis indicates that the primary reason for Mexican imports of U.S. poultry is the huge
retail price differential for processors of chicken parts between the two markets. However, feed costs in
Mexico are also part of the story. Although data on Mexican feed grain prices are not available, it appears     
17 Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Mexico Poultry and Products Annual 2002,”
Sep. 4, 2002; Mexican Secretariat of Agriculture (SAGARPA), “Structure of the Swine and Poultry Industries in
Mexico,” 2002, and author’s interviews with Mexican producers.
     
18 Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Mexico Grain and Feed, Mexican Government
Announces New Corn Import Certificates 2002,” Sep. 4, 2002.
     
19 Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Mexico Poultry and Products Annual 2002,”
Sep. 4, 2002; Mexican Secretariat of Agriculture (SAGARPA) “Structure of the Swine and Poultry Industries in
Mexico,” 2002; and Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Feed Situation and Outlook,”
Apr. 2002.
     
20 Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Mexico Grain and Feed Annual,” Mar. 12,
2002, and “Mexico Grain and Feed, Sorghum and Corn Update,” Nov. 5, 2002.
     
21 Authors’ interviews with Mexican poultry producers.
     
22 Mexican Secretariat of Agriculture (SAGARPA) “Structure of the Swine and Poultry Industries in Mexico,”
2002, Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Mexico Grain and Feed Annual,” Mar. 12,
2002, and “Mexico Grain and Feed, Sorghum and Corn Update,” Nov. 5, 2002.
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that Mexican poultry producers face higher feed costs than their U.S. counterparts.
17 This cost difference
is not because of the U.S. farm programs, but rather because of high prices of Mexican imported corn and
low availability of domestically produced corn and other feed grains for the Mexican poultry sector.
Given the relative size and proximity of the U.S. market, the price of imported corn in Mexico is
the U.S. price plus the tariff, plus the transportation cost of moving product from the United States to
Mexico. Under NAFTA, Mexico maintains a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on imports of corn from the United
States. In-quota tariff rates are low, 1 percent to 2 percent. However, over-quota rates are prohibitive and
in 2003 the over-quota rate is 91 percent. Licenses to import at the low in-quota tariff are allocated by the
Mexican Government on an industry basis (such as livestock and starch industries).
18 Although
traditionally the livestock sector has received about 50 percent of the in-quota imports, there are
indications that this still does not provide a large enough supply to result in prices comparable to those of
U.S. poultry producers.
19
Mexican poultry producers rely heavily on imported feed grains and nearly one-half the feed
grain available to the livestock sector is imported from the United States.
20 As a result, the prevailing
price in half the feed grain market is the U.S. price delivered to Mexico, which includes tariffs and
transportation costs. The transportation differential, the cost to ship feed grain from the United States to
Mexico, is not born by U.S. poultry producers, who instead face much lower transportation costs because
they are closer to their feed grain supply. The high delivered price for imported grains also permits
Mexican feed grain producers to receive a higher price because they can sell at prices comparable to the
U.S. delivered price. This results in higher feed grain costs for Mexican producers. Additionally, a less
efficient transportation system in Mexico, as compared with the United States, increases the cost of
distributing the feed, corn, or sorghum. Less developed transportation infrastructure in Mexico also
increases the cost and time required to deliver feed grain.
21
In addition to tightly controlled imports, domestically produced supplies of yellow corn appear
inadequate. A comparison of U.S. and Mexican corn sectors is shown in table 4. These data demonstrate
the vast differences in scale and productivity between U.S. and Mexican corn farmers. U.S. farmers plant
almost four times the area and get better than three times the yield of their Mexican counterparts. Thus,
the total supply of feed for each country’s poultry industry is vastly different, with U.S. producers having
access to a considerably larger supply.
The supply of feed grains in Mexico is from domestic production and imports of both corn and
sorghum.
22 However, the vast majority of Mexican corn production is white corn for human consumption.      
23 Authors’ interviews with staff of the U.S. Grains Council and Foreign Agricultural Services, U.S. Department
of Agriculture.
     
24 Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Mexico Poultry and Products Semi-Annual
2003,” Jan. 27, 2003, and Mexican Secretariat of Agriculture (SAGARPA) “Structure of the Swine and Poultry
Industries in Mexico,” 2002.
     
25 OECD, “Agriculture Policy in OECD Countries Monitoring and Evaluation 2002.” Jan. 2003, USITC staff
interviews with FAS staff, and ASERCA.
     
26 Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Mexico Grain and Feed Sorghum and Corn
Update,” Nov. 5, 2002.
     
27 OECD, “Agriculture Policy in OECD Countries Monitoring and Evaluation 2002,” Jan. 2003, USITC staff
interviews with FAS staff, and ASERCA.
     
28 Provided by Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, originally published in Diario
Official, Government of Mexico.
     




Comparison of U.S. and Mexican corn sectors, 2001
Item Mexico United States
Production (million metric tons) ....................................... 2 0 . 4 2 5 2
Area (million hectares) ............................................. 7 . 8 2 9 . 3
Y i e l d  ( t o n s  p e r  h e c t a r e ) ............................................ 2 . 6 9
Source:  U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Less than 1 percent of Mexican corn production is yellow corn for livestock feed.
23 Based on 2002, a total
of 13.6 million metric tons of feed were available to the entire Mexican livestock sector (consisting of
5.6 million metric tons of Mexican sorghum production, 4.4 million metric tons of sorghum imports,
3.5 million metric tons of yellow corn imports, and 200,000 tons of Mexican yellow corn production).
Data from the Mexican Poultry Producers Association (UNA) indicate that the Mexican poultry industry
requires approximately 7.6 million metric tons of feed grain, while the pork industry has an annual feed
need of about 4.5 million metric tons.
24 On the basis of these estimates, Mexico’s other livestock
industries, specifically the beef and dairy industries would have only 1.5 million metric tons of feed
available. This demonstrates the tightness of feed grain availability in Mexico, owing to growing demand
from the livestock sector at a time when additional supplies of corn from imports are subject to extremely
high tariffs.
Other Factors to Consider
The Mexican Government provides assistance to farmers, especially to its corn farmers. There are
two main support programs and some additional smaller programs.
25 The largest program is PROCAMPO
which pays a fixed amount per hectare; for the current crop year the payment is 905 pesos. Current
forecasts are that Mexico will harvest approximately 8 million hectares this crop year.
26 This equates to
total payments of approximately 7.2 billion pesos (roughly $700 million). The second program is
provided through the Support Services for Agricultural Marketing Agency (ASERCA) and consists of a
payment per metric ton of corn.
27 The payment amount and the tons of crop eligible vary by state. For
example, during the last crop year the ASERCA program in the Chiapas paid 270 pesos per ton for white
corn and 380 pesos per ton for yellow corn. In Chihuahua the payments were 180 pesos per ton for white
corn and 220 pesos per ton for yellow corn. In these two states, payments were made for 872 thousand
tons of corn for a total expenditure of approximately 212 million pesos (or $21 million).
28 The Mexican
Government also provides some assistance to offset transportation costs from the farm to the city and has
provided export subsidies on white corn to draw down high inventory levels.
29 It is important to note,     
30 Authors’ interviews with Mexican farm organizations and ITAM conference.
     
31 Ibid.
     
32 Mexican Secretariat of Agriculture (SAGARPA) “Structure of the Swine and Poultry Industries in Mexico,”
2002.
     
33 Ibid.
     
34 “Economic and Policy Outlook for U.S./Mexico Bilateral Agricultural Relations,” presentation by
Undersecretary of Agriculture, J.B. Penn, Mexico City, Nov. 25, 2002.
     
35 USDA, ERS, “Mexico. Briefing Room. Basic Information,” Dec. 12, 2002.
     
36 “Economic and Policy Outlook for U.S./Mexico Bilateral Agricultural Relations,” presentation by
Undersecretary of Agriculture, J.B. Penn, Mexico City, Nov. 25, 2002.
     
37 USDA, FAS, NAFTA Agriculture Factsheet, Special Agricultural Safeguard Provision, Jan. 1998.
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however, that there are reports that not all farmers eligible for the payments receive them.
30 Also, Mexico
has a significant number of what can be called tenant farmers who work land they do not own. Payments
through the PROCAMPO program and perhaps other programs are received by the landowner, not the
farmer.
31
Mexico’s poultry industry has been the fastest growing sector of Mexico’s livestock industry.
Between 1990 and 2001, Mexico’s poultry production grew at an annual average rate of almost
9 percent.
32 This growth rate was fairly constant both before and after NAFTA. If this is the case, why are
imports such a concern? The likely answer is that Mexico’s poultry industry is highly concentrated, with
the top three producers—Bachoco, Pilgrim’s Pride, and Tyson accounting for 52 percent of the market,
while the top ten producers account for 67 percent of the market.
33 The remaining market share is held by
a larger number of smaller firms. This would appear to indicate that problems in Mexico’s poultry
industry do not stem from NAFTA or U.S. farm payments, but that the benefits of production growth are
not being distributed among all sections of the Mexican poultry industry.
Another key issue is that Mexico’s policies and institutions discourage the gains of increased
productivity and trade from being distributed evenly within agriculture.
34 For example, the Ejido system
of land tenure (commonly held land) still persists in many parts of Mexico which results in land
fragmentation and uneconomic farm sizes. The lack of land ownership by farmers operating the Ejido
land means that land cannot be used as collateral for loans and as a result investment and productivity are
low.
35 In general, rural credit is expensive, making it impossible for small farmers to expand operations.
Weak banking and legal systems have also been identified as contributing to the structural problems of
Mexican agriculture. Banks often impose highly restrictive collateral requirements, while the legal system
is not sufficiently strong to enforce payment requirements and to allow lenders to obtain collateral in
cases of loan default. The land ownership and inadequate banking and legal systems mean that foreign
direct investment in Mexican agriculture by small to medium U.S. firms have been discouraged. Other
problems facing Mexico’s agricultural producers include a poor transportation system and the lack of cold
chain infrastructure. Both these factors particularly increase the costs of marketing and distributing fresh
and chilled products throughout the country. The use of state-of-the-art technology in food production
and processing is also limited to a relatively small number of operations, and most production equipment
in Mexican agriculture is out-moded. Other factors negatively impacting Mexico’s agricultural
competitiveness include poor water quality, lack of biotechnology policy, lack of agricultural education
and extension, and poor market information and statistical reporting.
36 
Safeguards Under NAFTA
NAFTA allows participating countries to increase tariffs to MFN rates if, as a result of tariff
reductions, imports increase to levels that cause (or threaten to cause) harm to the domestic industry
producing similar products.
37 NAFTA safeguards, are designed to provide temporary relief (a maximum     
38 USDA, FAS, “Mexico. Poultry and Products. Investigation on Bilateral Poultry Safeguards on Chicken Leg
Quarters,” Gain Report # MX2166, Dec. 5, 2002.
     
39 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “U.S. Works to Secure Poultry Exports to Mexico,” Press Release,
Jan. 23, 2003.
     
40 Comments by Jim Sumner, President of the U.S.A. Poultry & Egg Export Council, Wall Street Journal, Dec.
20, 2002.
     
41 USDA, FAS, Mexico. “Mexico. Poultry and Products. Poultry Banned due to Exotic Newcastle Disease,” Gain
Report # MX3007, Jan. 13, 2003.
     
42 Comments by Bill Roenigk, Vice President National Chicken Council, Associated Press, Jan. 1, 2003.
     
43 Salin, D.L., W.F. Hahn, and D.J. Harvey, “U.S.-Mexico Broiler Trade: A Bird’s-Eye View,” USDA, ERS,
LDP-M-102-01, Dec. 2002.
     
44 Ibid.
     
45 Ibid.
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of 3 years) from imports and requires that compensation be made to the supplying country, usually in the
form of lower tariffs on other U.S. exports into Mexico. Late last year, UNA requested that the
government place a safeguard on U.S. chicken leg quarters.
38 This led to the start of an investigation by
the Mexican Government to determine whether such a safeguard is justified under NAFTA rules. The
result of the investigation is expected mid 2003. However, as an interim measure, Mexico recently
imposed a provisional safeguard, in which Mexico agreed to allow 50,000 metric tons of U.S. chicken leg
quarters into the Mexican market with a zero tariff. Imports over the 50,000 metric ton limit would face a
tariff of 98.8 percent.
39
The U.S. poultry industry agreed to this deal partly because it feared continued use of non-
scientific testing requirements.
40 Since June 2002, U.S. poultry has been effectively banned following
Mexico’s introduction of new Avian Influenza testing requirements that U.S. producers were not able to
meet. Similarly, last month Mexico banned all U.S. poultry products (except cooked meat) following an
outbreak of Exotic Newcastle Disease (END) in California.
41 Although the disease was confined to
California, product from all 50 U.S. states was banned. There was also concern by U.S. exporters that, if
no deal were struck, U.S. product would inevitably become subject to antidumping duties. The hope of
U.S. poultry interests is that with the safeguard, all illegitimate trade issues will go away and only duties
affect trade.
42 Although the safeguard action is not a desirable development, it may be better than the
alternatives: technical trade barriers, additional duties, and at worst, a renegotiation of NAFTA.
Potential of Mexico’s Poultry Exports to the United States
At the beginning of this article, we commented on the overall impact of NAFTA on Mexico.
Mexico currently runs a sizeable trade surplus with the United States, and 80 percent of Mexico’s
agriculture exports are to the United States. Why then has the Mexican poultry industry not been able to
take advantage of NAFTA for its benefit? Certainly, higher feed costs, smaller companies, and consumer
characteristics play a significant role in the inability of Mexico to export poultry to the United States. In
addition, Mexico lacks the regulatory approval needed from the U.S. Government to export to the United
States.
43
In order to export fresh poultry to the United States, Mexico must first ensure U.S. authorities that
the poultry is produced in states considered low risk for END, a particularly virulent poultry disease.
44 At
this time, only Sinoloa and Sonora have been certified as low risk for END.
45 However, the Mexican
Government continues to work towards eliminating the disease. Additionally, Mexican poultry plants
must be certified by U.S. authorities that their standards of health and safety are equivalent to those in the
United States. Plants in Sinaloa and Sonora are working on obtaining this certification. If Mexican
poultry producers can successfully control or eliminate END and meet the other sanitary requirements to11
obtain permission to export to the United States, the current status of the industry could change
dramatically.
When Mexico’s poultry producers receive permission to export to the United States, they will
have access to a huge market. With access to cheaper feed, the large, modern Mexican producers would
then be operating on a level playing field. The factors that make Mexico a complementary export market
for U.S. producers could also make the United States a complementary export market for Mexican
producers. The dynamics of the Mexican poultry industry could therefore change dramatically.
Conclusion
Based on the analysis we provide for poultry, neither favorable tariff treatment under NAFTA, 
nor government payments are sufficient reasons to explain growth in poultry imports from the United
States. Poultry production in Mexico increased sharply in recent years during the same period that
imports grew. We argue that two factors harm Mexican producers, factors that are internal to Mexico’s
agricultural sector and which can only be changed by reforming Mexico’s domestic agricultural policy.
First, Mexico’s support for its feed grain sector, which includes high tariffs and import quotas on corn,
makes the cost of feed artificially high to Mexico’s poultry producers. Second, Mexico’s policies and
institutions discourage the gains of increased productivity and trade from being distributed evenly within
agriculture. Lack of rural credit, poor marketing and distribution, issues of land tenure and farm size, and
access to affordable agricultural inputs, are among key institutional and structural problems that adversely
affect Mexico’s competitiveness in poultry vis-à-vis the United States. 